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Abstract
This article focuses upon issues that public policy makers need to address, when trying to stimulate
world-leading research into new areas, which are potentially also valuable to solving societal challenges.
Our analysis helps contribute to the theoretical discussions about governance of new knowledge. We
focus upon the sequence of events surrounding the main actors of a recent crisis of regenerative medi-
cine in Sweden. We define governance theoretically, and use a conceptual model in order to structure
the empirical analysis. Regenerative medicine is an interesting setting to explore these topics, not least
because both public and private actors are often involved, and because governments struggle with how
to promote ‘translational research’, e.g. diffusing scientific research into clinical practice. Our case study
helps understand the process that led up to a crisis in regenerative medicine and identifies and
discusses four issues that need to be addressed by policy makers.
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1. Introduction
Public policy makers face challenges, when trying to stimulate what
is in policy terms called world-leading research, and specifically new
areas which are also potentially available to solving societal chal-
lenges. Governments can invest money, but no one can promise that
the scientific research involved will be successful—but the govern-
ment hopes to both open up new knowledge frontiers as well as cap-
ture the reputational and economic returns to potential scientific
success in such areas. To some extent, then, what policy makers call
world-leading research involves taking risks as compared to known
knowledge, because otherwise one could not discover and test new
ideas. One stream of research within the innovation systems and
policy literature argues that the concept of governance can be used
as a way of conceptualizing public policy for innovation, especially
involving public–private partnerships (Borrás 2011; Edquist and
McKelvey 2000; Nelson 1993), drawing upon traditions in political
science about collective action (Ostrom 1990). Governance is an
interesting concept, because governance is a theoretical idea about
the complexity of how actors interact, when not only responding to
markets or hierarchies. Here, governance refers to mechanisms for
coordinating and regulating intended interactions related to the
development and diffusion of new knowledge. Developing the con-
cept further can help specify what roles that government could take,
as compared to the roles played by the individuals and organizations
involved. This article proposes a conceptual framework for under-
standing how actors interact in ways which create (or fail in creat-
ing) collective action and governance, which we then use to analyze
a recent crisis in regenerative medicine and identify and discuss
issues that policy makers need to address when trying to stimulate
world-leading medical research and innovation.
More specifically, from the perspective of science and innovation
policy, a key policy challenge is to understand how and why actors
and their interactions promote the development and diffusion of
new knowledge into society. Public policy makers have been chal-
lenged about how to understand, impact, and design governance for
specific scientific and technological areas (Borrás and Edler 2014;
Gerritsen et al. 2013; Meijer et al. 2012; Salter and Salter 2010). In
recent decades, public policy makers have been considering many
new policy instruments, such as how to develop networks and facili-
tate interactions among different types of actors. This theoretical
approach is interesting for analyzing regenerative medicine, also
because these processes of medical research and medical innovation
in turn involve actors from science, market, and the government.
The article uses a detailed historical narrative about the key
actors and interactions involved in the building up of scientific and
clinical knowledge in regenerative medicine at Karolinska Institute
(KI), Sweden, which is an internationally leading university in
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medicine. However, the case study is primarily focused around the
public outcry and crisis that has become associated with a single
clinical-scientist hired by the KI to translate ground-breaking
research into clinical practice. The national institutional context
involves a strong public policy push to attempt to concentrate
research funds into leading fields, such as the fast-moving field of
regenerative medicine. We argue that this created a demand for star
scientists willing to take the risks needed to move the field, and that
this risk taking was made possible due to uncertainties at the inter-
face between medical research and practice and due to a culture of
human experimentation in medicine.
Section 2 presents a brief overview of the crisis. Section 3 selec-
tively reviews theories, enabling us to propose a conceptual frame-
work involving the concepts of governance, collective action, and
common resource pool. Using this framework, the specific crisis is
analyzed, including interactions among the key actors. Section 4
presents details of the case study, in relation to the main actors and
interactions, including their governance, while Section 5 provides a
more specific analysis of the case.
Section 6 returns to the challenges of public policy, specifically
in relation to regenerative medicine, using the theoretical framework
of governance. The final section considers conclusions and areas for
future research, in relation both to the special case of regenerative
medicine as well as in the more general case of public policy
designed to stimulate governance for the development and diffusion
of knowledge in fast-moving fields.
2. This crisis of regenerative medicine and its
main actors
In January 2016, a Swedish television documentary aired on public TV
(Lindquist 2016), which tells the story of the thoraic surgeon Paolo
Macchiarini at the KI in Stockholm and his attempts to develop a new
procedure for replacing parts of the trachea by growing stem cells on a
synthetic scaffold, which was subsequently implanted into a patient.
The national institutional context which enabled the hiring of
Macchiarni at the KI goes back to earlier Swedish public policy,
designed to promote world-leading scientific research. In 2008, the
government introduced a new science and innovation policy where
only a few, but strategically selected, research areas would receive
long-term funding on a scale unprecedented for Sweden. One of these
strategic research areas (SRA) was regenerative medicine. Based on
this new policy, in 2010 the KI applied for and received a large 5-year
government grant for regenerative medicine. KI had a strong incentive
to show good performance during these 5 years, because in case of
good results, the government indicated that this large-scale funding
might become a permanent addition to the university’s funding base.
The 5-year grant for regenerative medicine enabled the KI to
attract world-renowned scientists, one of which was Paolo
Macchiarini—who was considered a pioneer in translating stem cell
research into clinical practice. The first operation, performed in
2011 at the Karolinska University Hospital (KUH), was originally
presented as a ground-breaking achievement documented in presti-
gious medical journals and hailed by the press. Macchiarini and his
collaborators, using equipment provided by an American company
Harvard Apparatus Regenerative Technologies (HART), subse-
quently performed a number of similar operations.
Five years later, a different picture was painted. The Swedish
public television (SVT) aired a 3-hour documentary called The
Experiments (Experimenten) by Bo Lindquist (2016). Based on
footage from teams from German TV and Swedish TV, the 3-hour
series followed Macchiarini over several years, including operations
using the synthetic trachea implants at KUH, as well as similar oper-
ations in Russia. The documentary showed patients preparing for an
experimental implant operation followed by interviews with their
close relatives who believed that the operations contributed to the
patients’ premature deaths. Furthermore, the documentary pre-
sented information that suggested that the operations lacked proper
scientific support and regulatory approval, and showed leaders of
the prestigious KI defending the key scientist’s conduct despite
mounting evidence of its inappropriateness.
A public outcry followed in Swedish media, where KI was
criticized for supporting Macchiarini’s conduct. The magnitude of
the crisis can be illustrated by the reaction of the Royal Swedish
Academy of Science as reported in The Lancet:
The resignation of Anders Hamsten as Vice-Chancellor of the
Karolinska Institute has accelerated a growing sense of emer-
gency within the Swedish biomedical science community. His
departure comes during the same week that the Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences issued an unprecedented statement accusing
Paolo Macchiarini of ‘ethically indefensible working methods’.
The Academy is the body that awards annual Nobel Prizes in
Physics, Chemistry, and Economics (the Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine is awarded by the Karolinska Institute,
hence the likely acute embarrassment at the tarnished reputation
of one of the world’s most respected scientific centres) (Horton
2016).
Multiple investigations on topics ranging from research fraud to
criminal misconduct were started following the airing of the
documentary (Karolinska Institute 2016b). Four members of the
Nobel Prize committee in Physiology or Medicine resigned. The
Vice-Chancellor of the KI, Professor Hamsten, resigned after
originally defending Macchiarni. The Lancet, who published
Macchiarini’s paper in 2011 where the results from the first syn-
thetic trachea implant where reported, initially printed a statement
that Macchiarini should be considered innocent until proven
guilty—and referred to the Vice-Chancellor Prof. Hamsten’s
decision (Horton 2016). During 2015 and 2016, however, several
co-authors asked to be removed from the 2011 paper. In April
2016, the Lancet printed an expression of concern, noting the
‘ongoing uncertainty about the integrity of the work reported in this
paper. . . while reserving a final decision for when current investiga-
tions are completed’ (The Lancet 2016).
Public policy makers need to balance their desire for ‘world-lead-
ing research’ with governance mechanisms that can oversee risky sci-
ence, and especially when both public and private actors are
involved. In telling this story, the main timeline and actors in the
great success—and subsequent crisis—of world-leading research in
regenerative medicine can be summarized as follows. One key actor
is the Swedish government, which through public policy, had the
aim to spur innovation and economic development based on
research excellence in selected fields, one of them being regenerative
medicine. Others are the KI, which hired Macchiarini, as well as the
KUH, where operations were performed, and HART who supplied
technologies for growing the stem cells.
In the next section, we selectively review previous research on
innovation policy and the governance of research and innovation in
order to provide an analytical framework which is useful for struc-
turing the case study and thereby developing a more nuanced discus-
sion of how government and public policy can affect governance of
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public–private partnerships involving the development and sharing
of new knowledge.
3. Innovation policy understood through the
governance of research and innovation
In this section, we propose a theoretical framework, which was
inspired from previous work on a related issue by the authors
(Reference removed during review). The framework will be used to
structure the case study and analysis, using the three key constructs
of governance, collective action, and a common resource pool.
The rationale for science and innovation policy is often based—
even if loosely coupled—on social scientific understanding of science
and innovation, which changes over time. A recent shift in the
understanding the nature of the innovation process has led to a fun-
damental change in public policy for supporting innovation, accord-
ing to Borrás and Edquist (2013). Recent articles also question the
usefulness of public policy recommendations based on academic
research, when researchers are too far away from the political con-
text of policy makers (Flanagan and Uyarra 2016) as well as when
the policy design and instruments proposed is far from the reality of
policy makers (Martin 2016). Previously, public policy for research
and innovation was predominantly concerned with supporting sci-
ence and addressing market failures hindering the application of
new scientific knowledge, which is in line with the linear model of
innovation. More recently, a range of policy instruments are being
used that are based on a more critical view of economists’ notion of
market failures. For example, Gerritsen et al. (2013) examine the
concept of knowledge governance and distinguish different foci in
the literature such as network governance, self-governance, and
reflexive governance, respectively. Put more simply, public policy
has moved away from the economists tradition of ‘market failure’
arguments, and instead the foci become more problem-oriented and
systemic, and thereby addressing a larger list of possible failures in a
particular context (Arnold et al. 2003).
Our interpretation is that this change in foci for science and
innovation policy is visible in two empirical trends, which also moti-
vate the use of the concept of governance for capturing how innova-
tion processes are being coordinated and regulated. First, there is an
increasing number of soft policy instruments, e.g. public–private
partnership, that focus on mutual, and voluntary, exchange of infor-
mation and resources, where cooperation between the public and
private is less steered by the government (Borrás and Edquist 2013).
Second, there is the increasing use of project-based competitive
funding of research having a thematic, multidisciplinary, focus
(Lepori et al. 2007). These projects focus upon emerging technolo-
gies, such as nanotechnology and biotechnology, or societal chal-
lenges, such as ‘Secure, clean and efficient energy’ and ‘Health,
demographic change and wellbeing’ (European Union 2009;
European Commission 2011). In short, these two trends indicate
that governments work with the ideas of governance, when many
different actors are involved, and promote the interaction of hetero-
geneous actors in order to reach goals that go beyond excellence in
science.
We would like to point out that one implication of this shift in
understanding and in policy practice is that governance should not
be confused with public policy instruments, and nor is policy only
top-down. The actors are expected to cooperate on a voluntary basis
toward a common thematic goal—possibly with some financial
incentive from the government—but without top-down government
steering or purely driven by market coordination. We are also
assuming that, in addition to promoting science and economic
growth, policy makers want to ensure that issues of societal concern
are addressed, such as distribution of benefits and financial gain,
public hazards, and ethical conduct.
In political science, the concept of ‘governance’ refers to mecha-
nisms, such as rules and norms, which regulate activities that are not
entirely regulated through the market or the government (Jessop
1997; Loorbach 2010). As many actors interact, these actions con-
stitute collective action. Ostrom (1990) has made a major contribu-
tion to the field, by focusing upon self-governance, where social
entities voluntarily engage in regulating their own actions, and in
ways that can solve social dilemmas. However, within science and
technology studies, the concept of governance has been used for all
forms of regulation, including collective self-regulation as well as
regulation involving the market and government (Borrás and Edler
2014).
When both the institutions of science and the market are
involved in the production of knowledge, our position is that the
development and diffusion of new knowledge needs to be analyzed
as a complex, and often self-organizing, process involving interac-
tions and collaborations between both private and public actors
(Archibugi and Filippetti 2015; McKelvey 2014). When defining the
governance of such interactions we follow the broad approach pro-
posed by Borrás and Edler (2014), but in line with our focus on pub-
lic policy we limit ourselves to the regulation of intended
interaction, i.e. the conscious design of mechanisms guiding collec-
tive action toward meeting policy goals. Thus, in the context of this
article, governance refers to mechanisms for coordinating and regu-
lating intended interaction related to the development and diffusion
of new knowledge. These mechanisms can include interactions that
are a part of a collective action (self-governance), market mecha-
nisms, scientific community practices as well as government
regulations.
The intended interaction is in this article conceptualized as com-
posed of two parts: collective action and common resource pool.
For collective action, we focus upon the variety of actors involved,
which may act individually and for different goals and incentives,
but in some way create action and processes, which enable progress
of a specific field of science and technology. We acknowledge that
each actor may react to different imperatives and goals, and yet par-
ticipate in collective action to promote science and innovation.
Hence, the concept of collective action helps us highlight that public
policy initiatives must address the increasingly complex interactions
among heterogeneous actors with different interests and norms,
including both private and public actors that are trying to achieve
shared goals set by policy makers. For common resource pool, we
focus upon the diverse resources that both enable the collective
action and are also the outcome of the action. These resources
include people, knowledge, equipment money, and other resources
needed to both carry out the research and also translate those results
into innovations.
Hence, the key concepts in the framework are collective action,
common resource pool, and governance and they are linked as
shown in Fig. 1. At the top, actors engage in the intended interaction
to meet policy goals for research and innovation, i.e. the collective
action made possible by the common resource pool. The arrows
between the collective action and the common resource pool go
both ways, because the common resource pool can be considered an
outcome of the interaction, as well as an input to later collective
action.
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At the bottom, governance is referred to as the regulation of the
interaction among actors, as they engage in collective action and cre-
ating a common resource pool. Note that the dotted line thus distin-
guishes the intended interaction from the regulation of the
interaction, i.e. its governance.
More specifically to explain Fig. 1, let us first use these concepts
to introduce the broader field of regenerative medicine, before using
it in relation to our case study described in the next section.
The research and clinical activities related to the trachea
implants pioneered by Macchiarini and his collaborators belong to
the field of regenerative medicine. Regenerative medicine is ‘a field
of medicine devoted to treatments in which stem cells are induced to
differentiate into the specific cell type required to repair damaged or
destroyed cell populations or tissues’ (NIH, 2015: 23). Researchers
and policy makers justify the high public investment in regenerative
medicine with the argument that research is ‘game-changing’. For
example, the Mayo Clinic website states ‘Regenerative medicine is a
game-changing area of medicine with the potential to fully heal
damaged tissues and organs, offering solutions and hope for people
who have conditions that today are beyond repair’ (Mayo Clinic
2016).
Research in regenerative medicine is believed to create substan-
tial economic value and offer opportunities for industrial innovation
and national competitive advantage, which has made it a fast-
moving international field of research and innovation fueled by
large-scale public and private funding around the globe (Salter and
Faulkner 2011; Salter and Salter 2010). However, concerns have
been raised that the translation of basic research into workable
therapies will be slow due to challenges related to regulation, reim-
bursement, and clinical adoption (Gardner and Webster 2016). This
has led to policy responses stressing translational research, i.e. the
leading role of the clinical-scientist, the promotion of ‘patient
related research’, and the integration of the lab and the clinic
(Vignola-Gagné et al. 2014), and the generation of innovation
niches, i.e. collectively constructed socio-technical spaces for testing
and developing novel technologies (Gardner and Webster 2016). In
this way, policy makers support collective action for building a com-
mon resource pool (the intended interaction) amongst key actors in
a medical innovation system (Metcalfe et al. 2005) to stimulate
research, innovation, and its wider adoption.
Despite beliefs of the game-changing nature of regenerative med-
icine, and the subsequent economic benefits, there also exist a
number of controversies around the ethical, legal, and social impli-
cations and how risks are controlled and regulated (Allyse 2010;
Hogle 2014; Horst 2008). Thus, regenerative is not only a fast-
moving field but also highly contested. Furthermore, examples of
misconduct have been exposed in what was previously considered
ground-breaking research, leading to retraction of articles in Nature
(Cyranoski 2014). Hence, studying the issues related to governance
of intended interactions is especially pertinent for regenerative medi-
cine, given the fast pace, ethical considerations, risk regulation and
the close connection between research and health-care practice.
4. The rise and fall of a research center in
regenerative medicine at the KI
In order to understand the process of governance of intended inter-
action in regenerative medicine, we will follow the interaction
among the main actors around a specific research center established
to promote the translation of research in regenerative medicine into
clinical practice. The case study is organized through our theoretical
framework, using the concepts of collective action, resource pool,
and governance. The case study is of the rise and fall of the
Advanced Center of Translational Regenerative Medicine
(ACTREM), a research center led by Paulo Macchiarini at the KI.
The time frame of 2010–16 is set by the events leading to the recruit-
ment of Macchiarini by KI and the KUH in December 2010, his
joint tenure up until October 2013, when his contract with KUH
was not renewed, and up until his dismissal by KI in March 2016.
The case study is based upon archival and electronic documenta-
tion related to the crisis described in Section 2. Due to the nature of
the crisis, all parties have an interest in putting forward their own
particular interpretation of the sequence of events. We have had
three main methods to deal with it. One is to apply the basic idea of
critical reflection of sources—who said it, why and what interest did
they have in this interpretation. A second has been to use the popu-
lar press to build a structure of events, which can then be confirmed
or discarded when we look the original sources. A third has been to
try to find repeated accounts of similar events, known as triangula-
tion by using multiple sources to check statements, as detailed
below.
A variety of sources have been used and compared to each other.
The majority of documents and websites are in Swedish and the
authors have translated the content into English where appropriate.
Due to open access laws in Sweden for public authorities like univer-
sities and research councils, the majority of documents can be
assessed. However, a starting point is often needed, such as an
organization, an event or decision or a name of a person involved.
Hence, the extensive public press, such as blogs and newspaper
articles, has been useful to track down such information, and in turn
find the original documents. Thus, we have collected and analyzed a
wide range of sources including documents from foundations and
financers, reports from KI, reports from investigations, official state-
ments and press releases, unofficial viewpoints (blogs) from persons
mentioned by name in the processes, scientific journal articles, web-
sites, and reports in trade (medical) press. Moreover, KI has been
active in social media, providing their perspective of the sequence of
events, as documented on their website (Karolinska Institute
2016b). Recent reports from the various investigations have also
been used, e.g. Asplund (2016), Gerdin (2015), and Heckscher et al
(2016).
Figure 1. Governance of intended interaction initiated to meet policy goals.
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The case description is organized in three sections. Section 4.1
describes the building of ACTREM center, in the context of regener-
ative medicine in Sweden. Section 4.2 describes the activities within
the research center, including cooperation with KUH and industry
when performing the world’s first human transplant of a synthetic
trachea. Finally, section 4.3 describes the crisis that led to the closing
of the center.
4.1 Building regenerative medicine through public
policy funding and university ambitions
Below, we explain how the ACTREM center is a direct result of pol-
icy initiative by Swedish government, aiming to focus public and pri-
vate funding to SRAs. Therefore, this subsection focuses upon the
goals, imperatives and funding of the government and KI, and how
this led to the creation of the ACTREM center.
4.1.1 Funding of SRAs in Sweden 2010–14
A large investment in regenerative medicine at KI was possible due
to government’s investment into the SRAs. We interpret this science
and innovation policy as an answer to solve the popular perception
of ‘too much money, too little outcomes from universities’. This pol-
icy is part of the policy answer to a long-running debate about the
Swedish paradox around R&D (see reviews in Swedish in Ejermo
and Andersson 2013; McKelvey and Zaring 2016). Instead of
increasing the total funding to universities, the government identi-
fied a few research field, and only researchers in those fields could
compete for SRAs.
The Swedish government initiated their SRA initiative following
a proposal in the Swedish Research Bill of 2008. According to the
Swedish Government Bill, a SRA should fulfill the following criteria:
(1) Research that has the potential to be of highest international
quality in the long term; (2) Research that can help address large
societal needs and solve important problems in society; and
(3) Research that is within an area that is important for Swedish
businesses. Hence, these SRAs should help make Sweden interna-
tionally competitive as well as produce the highest international
excellence in science (Swedish Executive Government 2008).
For the total SRA policy initiative, the government made an
investment between 2010 and 2014 of a total of 590 million EUR,
and twenty centers were financed, through five funding agencies,1
and the Swedish Research Council took the lead in medicine. At the
end of the SRA policy initiative, an evaluation was carried out, with
the recommendation to make this additional money for ‘scientific
excellence’ a permanent addition to the universities who had
obtained the original SRAs (Swedish Research Council 2015c).
4.1.2 The StratRegen research program at the KI
In 2010–14 the KI received money from SRA for StratRegen2
(Karolinska Institute 2016c), a ‘strategic research program in Stem
Cell Research and Regenerative Medicine’ that ‘supports research
that advances our understanding of stem cell biology and
approaches to bring regenerative medicine to the clinic, for future
treatment of diseases for which there currently are no therapies’
(StratRegen 2016). We estimate that this program received around
3 million EUR per year from 2010 to 2014 from SRAs, for a total of
around 15.5 million EUR.3 Up through March 2016, the StratRegen
website stated that they had helped recruit five world-leading medi-
cal doctors and researchers, including Paolo Macchiarini.
So why did KI want to develop research in regenerative medicine
and recruit star scientists? The vision stated in a strategic document
from 2004 is ‘KI will by 2010 be Europe’s leading university within
medicine and health care as well as the leading innovation center
within life sciences in the Nordic countries and thereby be an impor-
tant motor for development in the country and in the Stockholm
region’ (Karolinska Institute 2004). They specified the aim to be
world-leading in stem cells and regenerative medicine, although at
the time, they did not have so much on the translational research,
especially the clinical side. KI was also active in commercializing
medical research into innovation from the 1990s and on, involving,
for example, KI Innovations AB and participation in the Stockholm
entrepreneurship initiative STING.
The StratRegen program was used as a platform to obtain a
number of large grants in regenerative medicine from various sour-
ces—including starting seven different research centers.4 The
authors have made a rough estimation that KI obtained and spent a
total between 33–50 million EUR on regenerative medicine between
2010 and 2014. Some centers are funded by private foundations
such as the Knut and Alice Wallenberg foundation, some by public
money such as the regional health authority and some by traditional
research financers.5 One of the centers was the ACTREM center led
by Paulo Macchiarini.
4.1.3 The ACTREM center
Hence, one person recruited as a part of KI’s ambitions to be world
leading was Paolo Macchiarini. According to Vogel (2013), Paolo
Macchiarini, Martin Birchall, and their colleagues carried out a tra-
chea transplant operation in Barcelona using stem cells back in June
2008, which ‘made medical celebrities of the surgeons who devel-
oped and implanted the artificial trachea. They were hailed as pio-
neers leading the world toward an amazing future of regenerative
medicine in which doctors will make replacement parts to order’.
Macchiarini and Birchall were called stars and super-stars of regen-
erative medicine. This likely helped motivate the fourteen professors
at KI, who wrote a letter of support of Macchiarini’s recruitment as
visiting professor, and the unusually active involvement of KI0s vice
chancellor in the recruitment process, both of which contributed to
a sequence of events were internal routines were not strictly fol-
lowed and early warning signals about Macchiarini’s past were
ignored (Heckscher et al 2016).
When KI recruited Macchiarini as a visiting professor in
December 2010, he was also employed part time as consultant and
surgeon at the KUH . In March 2011, he became the director of
ACTREM and Exceutive Director of the center was Philipp
Jungebluth, who was earlier supervised by Macchiarini during his
PhD studies at Medizinische Hochschule Hannover, Germany.
In February 2016, when the crisis was underway in Sweden, the
ACTREM websites listed fourteen researchers and guests as active
in ACTREM, as well as twenty-seven international collaborators,
including companies and professors.6 The collaborators listed
included University College of London (UCL) and Harvard
Apparatus Regenerative Technology (HART). During 2010–14
Macchiarini was awarded grants for research and clinical develop-
ment, for a total of 1.5 million EUR from the Swedish Research
Council and the Swedish Heart and Lung Foundation.7 These grants
were designed to extend his work with artificial scaffolds and stem
cells for regenerative medicine to other organs, especially the human
heart.
Each year, the StratRegen report to the government stressed KI’s
accomplishments in regenerative medicine, and specifically made
mention of Macchiarini’s work, not only on trachea but on ‘new
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synthetic organs to replace tissue and organs in the body in cases
where there is no other therapy available’ (Swedish Research
Council 2012). KI reports many activities related to regenerative
medicine which we interpret as building up a common resource
pool: recruiting leading international scientists; developing the most
modern equipment for research; support leading younger scientists;
expanding a set of laboratories that specialize in techniques that are
very complicated, and therefore cannot be mastered by individual
research groups.
Moreover, KI stresses in these reports that it is the Institute
which has published and done the synthetic trachea, and not only
Macchiarini. This is strongly stated in their 2012 report:
When looking back to 2011, we are happy to report several sci-
entific landmark discoveries at the Karolinska Institute that have
been published in leading scientific journals and also highlighted
in media around the world. One such example is the first trans-
plantation of an upper airway (trachea) to a patient that suffered
from a tumor in the airways that could not be surgically removed
without replacing the upper airways. The new airway was made
of synthetic material coated with the patient’s own cells, so it
would not be rejected after transplantation. This breakthrough
was spearheaded by Professor Paolo Macchiarini, but was also
based on a true collaboration by a number of research groups at
the Karolinska Institute, ranging from molecular biologists to
surgeons and transplantation immunologists. (Swedish Research
Council 2012)
However, this scientific landmark made by Macchiarini and his
collaborators at KI and KUH soon becomes heavily criticized, both
among his collaborators, in the wider research community, and in
public.
4.2 The first trachea implant operations using a
synthetic scaffold
This section addresses the hiring and initial expectations and suc-
cesses of the new KI visiting professor. When Macchiarini arrived at
KI he was a star surgeon known as the pioneer who performed the
‘first-in-man clinical transplantation of a stem cell based tissue engi-
neered organ’ in 2008 and had repeated such a surgery in 2010. He
was expected to improve his method for airway transplants and
‘adapt the procedure to other intrathoracic organs of increasingly
complex architecture’ (Karolinska Institute 2016d). Hence, we inter-
pret that his primary role would be translational research connecting
bioscience and clinical medicine as reflected by his dual appointment
by KI and KUH.
The trachea (windpipe) implants operations carried out between
KI and KUH were the first of their kind, world-wide. They were a
continuation from previous operations that Macchiarini had per-
formed in 2008 and 2010, where stem cells were used and said to be
growing on a human scaffold (e.g. from cadavers). However, the
operations at KI involved a synthetic scaffold (e.g. from polymers)
instead of a human one. A synthetic scaffold should be used, because
the research activities and goals of ACTREM were to integrate tis-
sue engineering, using biological or synthetic scaffolds, with cell
therapy, pharmaceutical therapy, and cells biology (Karolinska
Institute 2016). Integrating these fields required interaction with pri-
vate actors, to obtain the synthetic scaffolds. Moreover, the clinical
side was quite important, as indicative by the distribution of scien-
tific publications at the time, with many involving clinical
procedures.8
Three patients underwent operations in Sweden, and all came
from abroad. In June 2011, Macchiarini implanted a synthetic tra-
chea into a cancer patient referred to KUH from the Landspitali
University Hospital in Iceland. In November 2011, a second cancer
patient received a synthetic trachea after having himself approached
Macchiarini. This time the patient came from Maryland, USA. The
third patient, a women from Turkey was referred to KUH by her
Turkish doctor, and she received a synthetic trachea in August 2012
and was re-operated in July 2013 following severe complications.
The first patient died in January 2014, 30 months after the oper-
ation. The second patient died in March 2012, less than 4 months
after the operation. The third patient was still a live as of May 2015,
22 months after the re-operation, but was receiving intensive care at
KUH in late 2015 (Gerdin 2015). Other reports, including the
Swedish documentary, mention additional transplant operations
outside Sweden9.
The details of the setting of these operations have much impact
on interpreting later events. The decision to operate the patients at
KUH using a novel method was taken based on the patient’s critical
condition and the lack of alternatives.10 Thus, these patients were
not considered research subjects, and the decision to operate them
did not follow the procedures needed for ethical approval of
research studies (Asplund 2016). Despite that, the operation of these
patients later became a subject of research publications describing
the implantation and its outcome.11 In addition, the operations
involved what is called pharmaceuticals for advanced therapy. Stem
cells were extracted from each patient’s bone marrow and seeded
and grown, in the hospital, on a custom made synthetic scaffold
using specialized equipment. The equipment and the scaffold are
considered relatively simple medical devices, but once a scaffold
becomes seeded with stem cells it is classified, for regulatory pur-
poses, as a pharmaceutical for advanced therapy. The use of such
pharmaceuticals on human subjects requires approval of the
Swedish Medical Products Agency, and such an approval was not
obtained before the operations (Asplund 2016).12
Moreover, the scaffolds and specialized equipment needed for
seeding and growing the stem cells were obtained outside KUH and
KI. The scaffold for the first operation in June 2011 was supplied by
Professor Seifalian at the UCL (Gerdin 2015, Jungebluth et al.
2011). The bioreactor used for seeding and growing the stem cells
on the synthetic scaffold was provided by a German subsidiary of
Harvard Bioscience (Hugo Sachs 2016; Jungebluth 2011). It was a
further development of the bioreactor used by Macchiarini in
2008.13 Harvard Bioscience also supplied the scaffold and bioreac-
tor for the second operation at KUH in November 2011 and the
third one in August 2012. The scaffold provided by Harvard
Bioscience was of different construction compared to the one pro-
vided by UCL. Instead of a porous solid construction it was a fiber
construction (HART 2012).
Through this cooperation with Macchiarini, Harvard Bioscience
intended to develop and market the InBreath Airway Transplant
System including a synthetic scaffold and a bioreactor. The company
had acquired the property rights to the bioreactor design before the
first KUH operation. This was considered important at the time and
reported in October 2013 that the company has ‘completed the
acquisition of all patent rights to synthetic scaffold-based trachea
regeneration owned by Professor Macchiarini’ (Harvard Bioscience
2013). HART is incorporated as a fully owned subsidiary in May
2012 and spun-off in November 2013 and traded on NASDAQ.
The initial responses to the operations with synthetic trachea
transplant at KUH were extremely positive, both in the scientific
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press and in mass media. The first operation was described and pub-
lished as an article in The Lancet, which was initially published with
twenty-four authors (Jungebluth et al. 2011). In a press release,
Karolinska Institutet states: ‘For the first time in history, a patient
has been given a new trachea made from a synthetic scaffold seeded
with his own stem cells’ (Karolinska Institute 2011). Similar reports
are made in scientific, trade and popular press, where Macchiarini is
repeatedly called the ‘Star Surgeon’ and wide-ranging claims are
made. However, soon after the publication of the Lancet article crit-
ical voices emerged.
4.3 The crisis and the closing of the center
The initial criticism started much earlier. Following the publication
of the Lancet article in 2008 that reported the first stem cell human
implant by Macchiarini and colleagues using biological donor scaf-
fold (Macchiarini et al. 2008), concerns were raised about the valid-
ity of the assumption that the stem cells which were seeded onto the
scaffold would reconstruct a fully functioning tissue once being
implanted into the patient (Delaere and Hermans 2009; Wu et al.
2009). Similar concerns were also raised following the publication
of the Lancet article reporting the first implant using a synthetic
scaffold (Jungebluth et al. 2011). Once again, the major critique was
that the case reports from the operation failed to provide convincing
evidence of the assumed reconstruction of the trachea using the
patient’s stem cells (Delaere 2013; Vogel 2013).
Even though the first trachea implant made in 2011 was hailed
as successful and published as clinically successful, it became appa-
rent to physicians at KUH that the implants were not working as
well as reported the 2011 paper. The stem cells had not grown to
reconstruct the trachea. Furthermore, physicians at KUH invested
much effort to attend to the critical condition of the third patient,
following the operation. Their disbelief in the efficacy of the opera-
tions, combined with the fact that Macchiarini was not much
involved in dealing with the complications during care after the
operations, were important factors in the decision not to renew
Macchiarini’s contract with KUH in 2013, despite pressures from KI
to do so (Asplund 2016; Krey 2016; Vilhjalmsson 2016).
In June 2014, 5 months after the death of the first patient
implanted with the synthetic trachea, four physicians jointly
employed by KI and KUH filed a formal complaint at KI.14 They
claim that seven scientific articles authored by Macchiarini incor-
rectly—specifically too positively—describe the patients’ condition
and the functioning of the implant. Furthermore, they point out a
failure to obtain proper consent from patients, as well as failure to
obtain ethical permission from the Regional Ethical Board (Gerdin
2015; Karolinska Institute 2016b). Three of the physicians were co-
authors of papers that were being criticized and one of the physi-
cians had previously ‘basically moved into the hospital to take care
of the Turkish women [the third patient]’ (Karolinska Institute
2016b; Vilhjalmsson 2016).
Also in June 2014, Prof Delaere at KU Leuven filed a formal
complaint to KI in line with his previous criticism published in The
Lancet (Delaere and Hermans 2009; Delaere 2013) and Vogel
(2013).15
In Sweden, universities monitor the conduct of their researchers,
and not a national board. Hence, the university internal Ethics
Council investigates and makes decisions about matters of plagia-
rism, fraud, misrepresentation of data, misrepresentation of research
processes, and other types of scientific misconduct. Furthermore, if a
formal complaint is filed, an investigation is required and should
result in a formal response by the university.
Therefore, KI responded to the formal complaints, as required,
with an internal investigation. In 2015 the Ethics Council and
the Vice-Chancellor freed Macchiarini of suspicions of research
misconduct. An external examiner, appointed in 2014, had come to
different conclusions, but his conclusions were seen as input to the
KI internal process rather than binding recommendations (Gerdin
2015; Hamsten and Samuelsson 2015a,b). Moreover, both the
Swedish Research Council and Swedish Heart and Lung Fund with-
drew Macchiarini’s research grants shortly after the publication of
the external examiner’s report (Swedish Heart and Lung Fund 2016;
Swedish Research Council 2015a,b).
The magnitude of the crisis for the governance systems of medi-
cal research and innovation can be understood through the subse-
quent investigations after the TV documentary and public outcry.
By February 2016, 1 month after the airing of the documentary,
fourteen separate investigations were started in Sweden (Karolinska
Institute 2016e). Seven of the investigations were initiated by KI or
KUH, six by government, and one by the Royal Swedish Academy
of Sciences in association with the Swedish Society of Medicine.
Six of these investigations focused on procedures for handling
investigations about scientific misconduct, and of these, five investi-
gated the internal processes at KI. They covered issues ranging from
their internal handling of the allegations of scientific misconduct
(fraud), the details of the recruitment process, the reporting of extra-
mural occupations, and also the delegation of responsibility between
different actors in Sweden and within KI and KUH. Moreover, four
of the investigations focused on Macchiarini’s trachea implants as
health care procedures, i.e. whether laws and regulations were bro-
ken, and in two cases the case was quickly passed on to the police
and public prosecutor for investigations related to the death of the
patients. Three of the investigations focused on the interface
between research and clinical work in order to develop guidelines
for research and health care organizations. Finally, KI also decided
to reopen the original case of Macchiarini’s scientific misconduct,
where KI’s internal ethics committee and an external investigator
had come to different conclusions. Our interpretation is that the
organizations involved were using these investigations, in order to
try to determine whether existing norms and regulations were prop-
erly in place and followed, and whether new divisions of responsibil-
ity and procedures needed to be implemented.
After the long period during which KI leadership defended
Macchiarini, despite a long-series indications from external organi-
zations, KI finally decided to fire the clinical-scientist. The Staff
Disciplinary Board at KI decided on 23 March 2016 to ‘relieve
Paolo Macchiarini of his duties as a researcher at KI. He is to be
informed immediately that his contract has been rescinded’. Under
Swedish labour laws, they had already given notice to him that his
employment would end at the end of the year and his research cen-
ter, ACTREM, would be closed (Karolinska Institute 2016f).
5. Analysis of the intended interaction and its
governance
In this section, we analyze the case study of the rise and fall of the
ACTREM in terms of governance, collective action, and a common
resource pool. The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we summa-
rize the interactions between the actors participating in the collective
action, through three different phases of engaging in collective
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action for building the resource pool, using the resource pool, and
dismantling the resource pool. Second, we use this understanding in
order to interpret the case study using our framework.
5.1 Interactions during the rise and fall of the
ACTREM center
This subsection focuses upon the actors and interactions during the
building, using and dismantling of the common resource pool,
defined as resources needed to engage in collective action and result-
ing from such engagement (Fig. 2).
The first time period (2008–10) can be seen as the initiation of
the collective action, which is promoted by policy, and leads to the
building of the common resource pool at KI. The dynamics of the
case is driven by the interaction between government, represented
primarily by the Swedish Research Council, and KI. At roughly the
same time, both actors express clear goals for building world-class
capabilities in regenerative medicine, and when the Swedish govern-
ment proposes and funds a policy instrument—one type of collective
action—KI is the obvious partner. StratRegen is funded and organ-
ized to allow KI to improve their capabilities in regenerative medi-
cine, more broadly. However, despite sharing the goal of research
excellence, the two actors are driven by different imperatives. The
government is primarily driven by an economic imperative, i.e. the
expectation that scientific excellence in regenerative medicine will in
turn lead to innovation and economic development. KI, on the other
hand, is driven by a scientific imperative, i.e. the expectation that
excellence in stem cell research and regenerative medicine will help
them become a leading medical university. Translational medicine,
which in this case means efforts to translate scientific results from
stem cell research into clinical practice, is one action aiming to
accommodate these two different imperatives. Hence, part of the
funding for StratRegen is assigned to translational medicine, thereby
enabling the building up of a resource pool for such activities. More
specifically, this intersection of resources and imperatives sets the
stage for the hiring of a clinical-scientist, Paolo Macchiarini, who
had become well-known for his translation of stem cell research to
clinical practice involving the first stem cell based trachea
transplant.
The second time period (2011–13) is characterized by the actors
using this newly created resource pool. The dynamics are driven by
the interactions between KI, KUH, scientific community, and indus-
try, with our story focused around the ACTREM center. The collec-
tive action leads to the funding of ACTREM, not only by the SRA
funding, but also additional individual project grants and in-kind
funding by KUH and industry. Another part of the resource pool
consists of Macchiarini’s expertise and experience from previous
biological implants. Moreover, the operations and research also rely
on resources accessed through his networks, where he sources the
technology and knowledge which is adapted to the use of synthetic
scaffolds. His synthetic implants enjoy initial success and fame, but
soon criticism is raised, both in the research community and inside
his group. The main criticism is that his methods are flawed and
that evidence for their success, as reported in scientific articles, is
fabricated. There were also concerns about whether the operations
had received appropriate regulatory approval, following the stand-
ards and procedure for research and clinical practice. At the end of
this period, Macchiarini’s employment at KUH is not renewed but
he continues being employed at KI.
The third period (2014–16) is characterized by the dismantling
of the resource pool, not of everything related to regenerative
medicine at KI but of the part associated with Macchiarini. The
dynamics are again driven by the interactions between KI and the
government. After formal complaints are filed against Macchiarini,
KI is forced to investigate accusations of scientific misconduct,
because universities have this responsibility in Sweden, and not a
national authority. An external investigator was appointed, who
delivered a critical report. Subsequently, a number of Swedish
research funds, including the Swedish Research Council, withdraw
Macchiarini’s ongoing research grants even though the top manage-
ment at KI continued to defend their star scientist. Moreover, even
though the Swedish Research Council retracted Macchiarini’s grant,
they did apparently approve KI’s reporting of the same research
within the SRA initiative, where KI was positively evaluated and KI
received continued funding (Swedish Research Council 2015c). Our
interpretation is that the resource pool around Macchiarini was
weakened, which also reduced the possibilities for collective action
which could bridge stem cell research and clinical practice. The
larger StratRegen resource pool at KI seemed not to be too much
affected. However, the airing of the TV documentary where the alle-
gations against Macchiarini, and how they were handled by KI, led
to a crisis playing out in the public sphere. Finally, Macchiarini was
fired and his center closed down. Moreover, the legitimacy of KI as
a prestigious medical research university and guardian of the Nobel
Prize in medicine was threatened and action was required at the gov-
ernment level to rebuild confidence.
5.2 Interpretation of the case using the theoretical
framework
Using the above description of the main actors, their interactions
and processes, this section presents our interpretations in relation to
the theoretical framework. The results are also visualized in Fig. 3
below.
The actors involved in the collective action have the goal of
developing and diffusing scientific research and innovations within
regenerative medicine at the KI. The details in the case study show
the complex interactions among heterogeneous actors, both private
and public, within regenerative medicine. The goals and imperatives
of the Swedish government were to stimulate world-leading and
competitively useful research and innovation in this fast-moving and
prestigious field of medicine. Even though the KI was already active
in the field, the government made a very large investment through a
particular public policy initiative (called SRAs) as well as invest-
ments through the ‘normal’ research councils and foundations fund-
ing medicine in general and regenerative medicine specifically. The
scale of the SRA funding stimulates the specific case of collective
action described in this article, which includes the hiring—by the KI
and the KUH —of the clinical-scientist who was later pointed out as
causing the subsequent crisis. Business interests are also involved, as
visible through attempts to commercialize (patenting) and through
the involvement of companies in supplying crucial elements for the
surgeries. Thus, as visualized in Fig. 3, the collective action consists
of actors and their interactions, defined in terms of goals and imper-
atives, public–private interactions and funding.
The common resource pool consists of research centers linked to
the StratRegen project, but given our focus on the crisis, our atten-
tion is on one of the centers, the ACTREM. This research center is
the organizational basis for Paolo Macchiarini’s activities at KI and
KUH. A resource pool can be accessed by the actors singularly and
collectively, and used to develop new scientific knowledge and also
innovations. More broadly, ACTREM works in an international
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and local context, where KI also developed a wider set of capabil-
ities in regenerative medicine, as illustrated in their reports to the
government about how many different persons were involved.
Engaging in the contested surgeries required access to a physical
infrastructure of labs for stem cells, scaffolds, etc., as well as of hos-
pital operating theaters. There were also networks locally, nation-
ally, and internationally to not only obtain access to specialists but
also to access patients. Thus, as visualized in Fig. 3, the common
resource pool consists of knowledge and skills, physical
infrastructure, and networks needed to perform the operations using
the synthetic scaffolds, and creating the possibility for their further
development and wider adoption.
Governance is at the bottom half of Fig. 3, where we focus upon
the regulation of the interactions rather than the interactions them-
selves. Governance is obviously a difficult challenge for policy mak-
ers, in this case. A striking observation from this case study is the
sheer number and diversity of investigations that were initiated
because of the crisis. Given that they arise during a crisis, they
Figure 2. Sequence of major events 2008–16 in the rise and fall of the ACTREM center.
Figure 3. Interpretation of the case study in terms of the theoretical concepts of collective action, resource pool, and governance.
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highlight the multitude and complexity of the governance mecha-
nisms related to the intended interaction.
In medicine, governance is needed for this type of collective
action, in order to achieve cooperation as well as to regulate issues
of social concerns, such as distribution of benefits and gains, public
hazards, and ethical conduct. Some of the mechanisms, such as the
process of selecting and evaluating centers of excellence and govern-
ment regulation of health care and medical research, are top-down
mechanisms where the government directly regulates the behavior of
the participants. Other mechanisms, such as self-regulation by the
research community and university and hospital boards, are self-
regulatory, at least seen from the perspective of the policy maker.
Commercial actors are involved, as well as patenting by a scientist
and hence market mechanisms are also involved. Thus, as visualized
in Fig. 3, the governance consists of a variety of elements to regulate
intended interactions between the actors. We identify these as key:
processes for selecting and evaluating centers of excellence receiving
funding, self-regulating within research community, market incen-
tives, university and hospital boards, as well as government regula-
tion of health care and research.
6. Conclusions
The field of regenerative medicine in general—and our case study
specifically—demonstrates a series of issues policy makers need to
address, related to the governance of intended interaction of public
and private actors for developing and sharing new knowledge. In
concluding, we will identify and discuss four policy issues in relation
to the results of our case analysis and selected literature related to
the governance of research and innovation policy.
The first issue is about the complexity of governance. For
research and innovation in regenerative medicine there is a myriad
of governance mechanisms managed by different actors and address-
ing different aspect of the process. Few of them, however, are spe-
cific to the particular type of intended interaction. Each actor tries
to enforce slightly different forms of governance on the others,
which will promote their goals and imperatives. Thereby, one could
say that each actor would like to recommend different sets of policy
recommendations. The key point here is that the actors are linked
through the intended interaction of creating world-leading research
in regenerative medicine, which also has a societal impact through
clinical practice and industrial innovation—a set of activities and
interactions that require substantial self-regulation and alignment
with a number of existing governance mechanisms, few of which
that are specially designed for the task.
The second issue, from a public policy perspective, is that the
government has a strong interest in promoting regenerative medicine
for its expected economic benefits and contribution to employment,
industrial innovation and competitiveness (Salter and Salter 2010).
However, the government—and its agencies—play multiple roles.
On the one hand, the Swedish government has singled out this high-
prestige field, and thereby is attempting to push research and the
university system in particular directions through selective large-
scale funding. They are also expecting the knowledge generated to
be shared and translated into industrial innovation and clinical use.
On the other hand, the government is responsible for governance
mechanisms that regulate the operation of university research, medi-
cal research (e.g. ethics committees), delivery of health care, and the
introduction of new clinical procedures, including new drugs and
medical devices.
Moreover, one problem for public policy makers is that existing
governance mechanisms for research and clinical practice may not
be well suited to address novelties related to regenerative medicine.
We agree with Gardner and Webster (2016) who identify that one
of the main translational challenge is the existing regulatory regime,
which has been developed to govern drugs and medical devices, and
is not well suited to regenerative medicine. As a consequence, there
will be ambiguities in how the current regulatory framework should
be applied, or extended, to address novel technologies, e.g. stem
cell-based therapies, leading to iterative negotiation between clini-
cians and regulators when formulating quality and safety standards.
Once the crisis is public it is difficult to acknowledge the existence
of such negotiations, explaining the need and effort to find out what
went wrong.
The third issue, from the perspective of the policy maker, is to
understand the governance of the particular role of the university as
an intermediary between the government and the individual research
group. The university develops its own strategies, competes interna-
tionally, hires proficient researchers, etc., and is supposed to be
actively promoting the values and norms of the international scien-
tific community (autonomy, peer review, excellence). At the same
time universities are reacting to funding and political pressure from
the government and participating in intended interactions through
collective action and the building of shared resource pools. In our
case the pressure to perform is very high because, if successful, the
university can expect a substantial increase in the base funding it
receives from the government.
In the case study here, the strong financial incentives for excel-
lence could be seen to have created tensions for the university.
Scientific results might be controversial, especially if they belong to
a fast moving and contested field, such as regenerative medicine.
However, any uncertainties about the excellence of its research are
unfortunate when the university is being evaluated. Thus, one inter-
pretation of KIs continued support of Macchiarini, for months and
years after outside organizations had retracted his access to patients
(the hospital) and to research grants (public and private funding
organizations), is that the university leadership had a strong incen-
tive to promote and defend its activities within regenerative medi-
cine, because of an national evaluation, which could provide an
important source of funding and prestige in the national institu-
tional context.
The fourth issue from the perspective of medical research and
innovation is that experimentation of the kind performed by
Macchiarini and his collaborators has a long history in medicine.
Throughout history, new procedures have been tried out in the clinic
before their implications have been fully understood. This experi-
mentation has been based on cooperation between different organi-
zations—specifically university, hospitals, and companies—and has,
in retrospect, been considered very successful (Blume 1992;
Rosenberg 2009; Schlich 2004). Different codes of conduct and ethi-
cal procedures have been developed for each of the actors involved
in order to try to avoid negative outcomes, such as fraud, patient
hazards, inhuman experimentation, etc. However, due to regulatory
ambiguity and strong economic incentives, some studies suggest that
these conditions may normalize action within organizations, either
intentionally or unintentionally, that appears to outsiders as deviant
(Hedgecoe 2014). KI’s attempts to contain critique and to support
their star scientist despite a mounting evidence of inappropriate
behavior that had already resulted in the withdrawal of funding can
be interpreted as attempts to normalize behavior that they, at least
partially, considered important for successful medical research and
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innovation, even if the behavior does not strictly follow the norms
of science (Mulkay 1976).
In summary of the interactions between the above-mentioned
issues, it is clear that investing large sums of money into strategic ini-
tiatives in highly competitive, fast moving, and prestigious field, and
the hiring of start scientists can achieve policy goals of high scientific
performance, and economic activities. However, such a policy also
puts very high stakes and pressure for results, creates intense global
competition for star scientists, and may open up for behavior by
risk-taking individuals, that take advantage of regulatory ambigu-
ities, to be normalized within prestigious organizations, despite
being considered deviant by outsiders. Hence, we argue from the
case study that if societal concerns and crisis are not—or cannot
be—addressed, they may lead to a crisis of legitimacy for key actors
and eventually the whole field supported by policy makers. Even
later, after the crisis, when the problems and concerns that are iden-
tified have been addressed, there may remain a suspicion of whether
or not the governance of for medical research and innovation is
working slowing down the challenging task of translating new
research findings into valuable clinical procedures.
Finally, for future research, we suggest a focus upon how policy
affects risk-taking behavior and decision-making. One of the key
insights from the case studied in this article is the awareness of how
large-scale collective action, as in the case of the Swedish SRAs, cre-
ates strong incentives for risk-taking by multiple actors. From a gov-
ernance perspective, the issue is how this risk taking can be
regulated for each actor and for the medical research and innovation
system as a whole, as well as how to deal with failures. More
research is also needed about how governance mechanisms can be
designed so that they encourage enough risk taking to develop radi-
cally new knowledge and innovation, while at the same time pro-
tecting the population against misconduct and fraud.
Notes
1. Swedish Energy Agency, Formas, Forte, Swedish Research
Council and VINNOVA. All amounts are converted from SEK
into EUR using the average currency conversion rate for 2010–
14 as published by the Swedish Central Bank (www.riksbank.se).
2. In the documents and websites, the center has different names
over the years, including StemKI, Center for Regenerative
Medicine, and StratRegen.
3. The money was provided through the National Ministry SRA
policy, which was in turn channeled through the Swedish
Research Council.
4. Of the seven centers, the first six listed were visible on KIs
website, as of March 2016. The seventh center, ACTREM,
which had Macchiarini as director, was removed from the KI
website and closed in February 2016.
5. A KI professor in this field also obtained an ERC grant in
Spring 2016, but those sums is not included in the current cal-
culations estimating the investment into regenerative medicine.
6. The ACTREM website was viewed and downloaded on 9
February 2016. The website might not have been current, as
some publications were listed as in press in 2013. However it
was updated with links to the KI investigation in 2015 finding
him not guilty of research misconduct.
7. From the Swedish Research Council his group received 0.2
million EUR in 2011 for a 3-year project on an the bioengin-
eering of the heart and 1.1 million EUR in 2012 for a 5-year
project on the development of natural and bio-artificial
esophagus. From the Swedish Heart and Lung Foundation he
received 0.17 million EUR in 2011 for a 3-year project on
artificial heart.
8. In February 2016, fifteen articles in scientific journals were
listed on the ACTREM website. Two articles were in The
Lancet, listed as (2011 and 2013 in press) as well as articles in
journals like Biomaterials and The Annuals of Thoracic
Surgery. Most of these articles focused on clinical research,
i.e. reported outcomes from clinical procedures, rather than
results from scientific laboratory experiments.
9. In late 2011 Macchiarini became the leading scientist of the
International Scientific-Research Clinical and Educational
Centre of Regenerative Medicine at the Kuban State Medical
University in Krasnodar, Russia, where he, according to the
documentary, also performed trachea implants at the univer-
sity hospital.
10. In an written statement from 2014 Richard Kuylenstiema, who
was responsible for ethical issues related to the first operation,
stated that he had contacted the Medical Director at KUH, the
Swedish Medical Product Agency, and the local ethics commit-
tee who advised that the decision was a matter of medical care
ethics rather than research ethics (Gerdin 2015).
11. Most notable is the paper describing the outcome of the first
implant (Jungebluth et al. 2011).
12. Asplund (2016: 129) comes to the conclusion ‘the Macciarini
case demonstrates how one has selected informal rather than
formal means for contacting the [regulatory] authorities. Some
of those we have interviewed have seen this as an “infection
effect” from KI, where there is a culture of cutting corners’.
Furthermore, ‘A number of academic leaders we have inter-
viewed have reminded us that a lot of today’s advanced surgery
is based on bold actions by pioneers, even if it came at a cost of
high initial death rates’. Hence, that cutting corners may be nec-
essary for obtaining breakthrough knowledge.
13. HART was established as a separate unit in Harvard
Bioscience in early 2009 and incorporated in May 2012. In a
prospectus filed to the SEC in December 2012 it is reported
that the company has acquired the intellectual property
related to the bioreactor design used to create the landmark
2008 and 2011 tissue engineered implants (HART 2012).
Early 2016, in the wake of the KI crisis, HART changed their
name to Biostage (Biostage 2016).
14. The physicians claim that they informed Prof. Hamsten in
February 2014 about their concerns and had series of meet-
ings on the subject leading up to their Appeal for
Investigation. Furthermore, they claim that they received a
threat of immediate termination from KI in December 2014,
apparently for having filed the allegations (Corbascio et al.
2015). They file another formal complaint shortly after. Both
of these complaints were included in the investigation made
by an external examiner on behalf of KI (Gerdin 2015).
15. According to his statement in social media, he says that he
raised concerns as early as 2011 (via email to the then Vice
Chancellor of KI).
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